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Abstract  
The growing use of the concept of an affordance raises questions about its meaning and has led to 
much debate. This exploratory evaluation of usage reveals divergent meanings, exposes tensions and 
explains why there is confusion about the concept. The notion of an affordance focuses attention upon 
possible action, raising the issue of how affordances give rise to action. The discussion reveals latency 
in the nature of affordances, that they do not exist in isolation, can be designed into artefacts and have 
social, temporal and spatial dimensions for their actualization. An affordance is a necessary condition 
for its enactment, but sufficiency arises with the situatedness of enactment. Moreover, an affordance, 
which is actualized through its enactment, is thus performative. It is concluded that the term affordance 
should be used with caution and with more precision and rigour, as its everyday use is fraught with 
vagueness saying little about the complex dynamics that underpins affordance as a concept. 
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1.0 Introduction 
The term ‘affordance’ has recently pervaded the literatures, including that of 
Information Systems (e.g. Conole & Dyke, 2004; Zammuto, Griffith, Majchrzak, 
Dougherty, & Faraj, 2007; Leonardi, 2011; Robey, Raymond & Anderson, 2012; 
Treem & Leonardi, 2013; Goel. Johnson, Junglas & Ives, 2013; Gibbs, Rozaidi & 
Eisemberg, 2013; Fayard & Weeks, 2014). But why? Ever since the pioneering work 
of the Tavistock Institute in the 1950s (Trist, 1981) there has been recognition that the 
workplace cannot be split between technical and social systems. Instead, their 
interplay has given rise to profusion of conceptualisations, e.g. ‘socio-technical 
systems’ (Trist, 1981), ‘seamless web’ (Hughes, 1986), heterogeneous assemblages’ 
(Larkin, 1969, Landstrom, 2000), ‘socio-technical ensembles’ (Bijker (1995: 269), 
‘sociotechnical constituencies’ (Molina, 1990, 1997) or ‘sociomaterial assemblages’ 
(Suchman, 2007; Orlikowski & Scott, 2008). However, these terms disguise the 
nature of this complex entanglement (Orlikowski, 2005), mangle (Pickering, 1993) 
and imbrication (Leonardi, 2011) of technology and the human agent. Nevertheless, 
despite these rich insights, they fail to address the question of why a technology is 
taken up. On the one hand, the essentialist view emphasises the role of the properties 
of artefacts, is deterministic (e.g. Winner, 1980). On the other, the anti-essentialist 
emphasises the meaning held about an artefact, and the manner in which inscriptions 
embedded in the artefact are read (e.g. Grint & Woolgar, 1997).  
 
In contrast, the notion of affordance provides a bridge between the social and artefact, 
offering a concept to explain why a technology is taken up, operating at the micro-
level of the detail of human activity (c.f. Cos-Aguilera, Hayes, & Cañamero, 2004; 
Zammuto et al, 2007; Markus & Silver, 2008). Hutchby (2001), succinctly captures 
the argument when presenting the Gibsonian affordance as an alternative to the 
diametrical opposing essentialist and anti-essentialist views about technology. 
Affordances privileges neither view, instead supporting a mutually shaping 
perspective: “technologies can be understood as artefacts which may be both shaped 
by and shaping of the practices humans use in interaction with, around and through 
them” (Hutchby, 2001: 444). However, how does affordance explain this interplay 
between the social and artefact? 
 
The term ‘affordance’ was introduced by James J. Gibson in 1966, but it was in his 
seminal work “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception” (1979) that he 
developed his ‘theory of affordances’, which has since been the topic of much debate. 
This debate, which initially pre-occupied mainly psychologists, quickly shifted to 
researchers interested in the relationship between people and technology, in particular, 
Information Systems. One of the reasons for this on-going debate is that Gibson’s 
formulation of the term has been ambiguous (Şahin, Çakmak, Doğar, Uğur, Üçoluk; 
2007), allowing for misunderstanding (McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Norman, 2013)) and 
confusion (Şahin, et al., 2007). However, Jones (2003) reveals how Gibson’s thinking 
about affordances had evolved over time, suggesting that perhaps a clearer 
explanation would have emerged should the opportunity have presented itself. 
Nevertheless, that the debate has been on-going suggests that there is much interest in 
how in the concept of affordances can serve as an instrument in discourse about the 
relationship between humans and artefacts. However, the manner in which the term is 
used still reveals diversity and ambiguity in how the term is used, which merely 
serves to confuse.      
 
This paper explores the manner in which the concept of affordances has been used in 
a wide range of literatures. It draws upon a large pool of papers, though selectively 
focuses upon those which provide conceptual development. This study commences 
with a brief examination of the work of James Gibson and Donald Norman, then 
provides a thematic evaluation of subsequent formulisations of the term affordance. 
The contribution is to provide a preliminary overview of how the notion of affordance 
can be interpreted.  
 
2.0 Origin and early debates about the term 
1.1 James Gibson 
James Gibson, an ‘ecological psychologist’, ‘coined’ (1966) or ‘made up’ (1979) the 
word affordance to mean “something that refers to both the environment and the 
animal… The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 1979: 127), i.e. can be both 
positive (e.g. beneficial) and negative (e.g. injurious). Whereas the meaning of an 
object may change with the observer’s changing needs, the affordances offered do not 
change, are invariant, being always present. However, an affordance is not a property 
or quality residing in either the object or subject, but relates to how objects are 
perceived with regard to their possibilities for use. Affordances, “are properties of 
things taken with reference to an observer but not properties of the experiences of the 
observer” (Gibson, 1979: 137), “they are neither physical nor phenomenal” (Gibson, 
1979: 143). An affordance is not bestowed upon an object by a need of an observer 
and his act of perceiving it. The object offers what it does because it is what it is” 
(Gibson, 1979: 139). As such, affordances cut across the objective-subjective 
dichotomy. That affordances can be misperceived raises a critical question of how 
affordances are perceived – what information (stimuli) is there.  
 
Whilst Gibson, in his earlier work, draws attention to the role of learning when 
making sense of objects, Eleanor Gibson, his wife, reveals that learning was “not 
something that my husband thought a lot about” (Szokolszky, 2003: 271), though was 
an issue which interested her: 
And so, in designing a learning theory that fits development I have also used 
the notion of affordances. I think now that what is learned are affordances, and 
differentiation is a process that explains refining learning and behavior. But 
my notion of learning is really perceptual learning; I think that it is a discovery 
process. Children discover affordances through observation and consequences 
of their exploration. (Szokolszky, 2003: 274) 
Perceptual learning is described as “equally the means of discovering distinctive 
features and invariant properties of things and events” (Gibson, 2000: 295). 
Moreover, whilst it commences as exploratory activity (e.g. visually examining or 
trialing), it “can become performatory as an affordance is discovered. This shift is 
marked by making contact with the environment and ensuing control of it” 
(Szokolszky, 2003: 297).  
 
Gibson’s contribution is to draw attention to the action capabilities of observers, 
relative to that perceived.  
 
1.2 Donald Norman 
An alternative view was developed by Norman (1988). Norman, a cognitive 
psychologist, defined affordance as referring “to the perceived and actual properties 
of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how the thing 
could possibly be used” (Norman, 1988: 9). He acknowledges:  
I believe that affordances result from the mental interpretation of things, based 
on our past knowledge and experience applied to our perception of the things 
about us. My view is somewhat in conflict with the views of many Gibsonian 
psychologists, but this internal debate within modern psychology is of little 
relevance here (Norman, 1988: 219).  
Gibson’s example of a door draws attention to the importance of a signal, which 
informs us how to act, but that also that it is important to determine what are 
permissible actions based on affordances and constraints. 
 
However, Norman’s view is later revised and clarified:  
the term affordance refers to the relationship between a physical object and a 
person… An affordance is a relationship between the properties of an object 
and the capabilities of the agent that determine just how the object could 
possibly be used… Whether an affordance exists depends upon the properties 
of both the object and agent (Norman, 2013: 11).  
This reveals a shift from a properties emphasis to a relational perspective, with the 
warning of confusing properties as affordances. Counter to affordances are anti-
affordances that (constraints) prevent interaction and use. Moreover, affordance need 
not be visible, yet still exist, raising the distinction between real (physically present), 
perceived (appearances - signifiers) and invisible affordances. Thus, when interacting 
with an object, the challenge is to understand how to use it. This raises the question of 
how appropriate use is discovered. Norman draws upon Gibson’s view, that the senses 
“pick-up information about the world” (Norman, 2013: 12), with signals (information) 
contained within affordances revealing what is possible: “affordances determine what 
actions are possible. Signifiers [are signals that] communicate where the action should 
take place” (Norman, 2013: 14). Designers of objects, in order to make them 
understandable, can create ‘signifiers’ to reveal where to act, i.e. a signal 
“communicates appropriate behaviour” (Norman, 2013: 14). 
 
3.0 Gibson versus Norman 
Whilst there appear to be similarities between the two formulisations of affordances, 
they are distinctively different as noted by McGrenere & Ho (2000) and Sahin et al. 
(2007). Whilst a Gibsonian affordance is directly perceived, Norman’s affordance 
involves cognition, visibility and discoverability. For Gibson, an affordance is 
invariant and pertains to the object, though is not a property and exists with reference 
to the agent.  In contrast, the focus of attention for Norman’s affordance is upon the 
relationship between the properties of an object and the capabilities of the agent. 
Moreover, an affordance can be invisible, though an object can be designed to 
incorporate signals that enable affordances to be discovered.  
 
These different conceptualisations reflect the different orientations of Gibson and 
Norman; Gibson, who was concerned with the visual perception of affordances and 
did not make the distinction between human and animal, and Norman, whose interest 
lay with the design and utility of technology (McGrenere & Ho, 2000). However, 
these differences, together with lack of clarity in Gibson’s account of affordance 
(illustrated in the difficulty in establishing the nature of the relational aspect tacitly 
invoked in the Gibsonian affordance), has led to confusion about how to use the 
concept of affordance (Şahin, et al., 2007), as illustrated by McGrenere & Ho (2000: 
5): “yet most who cite Gibson and perhaps even quote him resort to using the meaning 
given by Norman”. Nevertheless, Kaptelinin & Nardi (2012) defend Gibson from 
criticism about any deficiencies with regard to his formulation of his theory:  
Gibson’s notion of affordance as “natural affordances”, such as those for 
manipulation and locomotion, is consistent with the overall aims of his 
research project which centered on perception. It would be unfair to criticize 
Gibson for not developing the notion of affordance beyond natural 
affordances, i.e., to criticize him for not choosing a different research agenda. 
Therefore, while current debate clearly indicates that Gibson’s original notion 
is too limited to properly serve the needs of HCI research and practice, the 
notion has its own inherent contours, and cannot be “upgraded” without being 
transformed into something it is not (Kaptelinin & Nardi, 2012: 970-971). 
 
4.0 Deconstructing the usage of ‘affordances’ into its constituent 
elements 
One of the relatively consistent views about an affordance is that it concerns the 
possible actions that an object offers. However, a more detailed evaluation of how 
others have used the term affordances reveals variety in the underlying concepts. 
Aside from differences in definition, there are differences in such issues as how 
viewed as a process and whether are perceived or interpreted, are relational or 
dispositional, or are representational or performative. To add are material, social, 
spatial and temporal dimensions. Finally, there are debates surrounding the design of 
affordances. 
 
Definition: One of the difficulties with the concept of affordances is that it is unclear 
what an affordance is. A cursory examination of the variety of definitions to be found 
in the literatures reveals the idiosyncratic nature of what constitutes an affordance (c.f. 
Lindberg & Lyytinen, 2013). Moreover, the concept lacks precision (Jarzabkowski & 
Pinch (2013). Affordances have been defined in terms of an offering (Gibson, 1979), 
relations (Stoffregen, 2000; Chemeo, 2000, 2003), properties (Norman, 1988; Gaver, 
1991; Turvey, 1992), and functionality (Cos-Aguilera et al., 2004). Indeed, it 
subsumes both functionality and behavior (Maier & Fadel, 2001). It can reside in the 
object (Gibson, 1979, Gaver, 1991; Turvey, 1992) or are emergent in the relations 
between object and subject (Stoffregen, 2000; Chemero, 2003). There is clear 
divergence about what constitutes an affordance, illustrated by Sahin et al. (2007) 
who, through a systematic process of formulating a definition for the affordance of 
autonomous robotics, establish five definitions, each pertaining to a different 
viewpoint. To add, is the study of the affordances of spaces and buildings, with 
implications on human practices (Fayard and Weeks, 2005; Maier, Fadel & Battisto 
(2009); Mittleman, 2009). Affordances are offered, not only by the object, but also by 
space which has implications for the design of space (Atmodiwirjo, 2014). Faraj & 
Azad (2012) acknowledge the many different meanings of affordance but conclude 
that it is perhaps counterproductive to establish ‘one true meaning’. Whilst it may be 
incorrect to state that there are right and wrong definitions, this does raise the 
desirability of more precise articulations of the term is being used to avoid 
misunderstanding. 
 
Affordances as process: Since the concept of an affordance relates to possible actions, 
this raises the question of how, i.e. what is the process which results in an affordance 
being sought, recognised and actualised. Bernhard, Recker & Burton-Jones’s (2013) 
deconstruction of this process, drawing upon research in the Information Systems 
domain, commences with an (1) object with ‘existing’ affordances and a (2) user with 
intent. Affordances are (3) perceived, implying there is (4) information available to 
reveal their presence, and (5) actualised, involving (6) effort (i.e. how easy is 
actualisation), which gives rise to (7) effects.  This draws attention to the semiotic as 
aspects of affordances (i.e. the nature of the signifier), and whether it correctly 
perceived as such. Moreover, it is proposed that this deconstruction usefully avoids 
the argument (e.g. McGrenere & Ho, 2000; Hutchby, 2001; Leonardi, 2011; Robey et 
al, 2012; Norman, 2013) of whether affordances reside in the object, user or the 
relationship between the two and what constitutes these affordances. Affordances 
exist, are perceived and are actualised in a process that spans time. Pollock (2012) 
proposes the term ‘affordizing’ to denote the actualisation of an affordance. However, 
Markus & Silver (2008) claim that affordances offer ‘potentially necessary’ 
conditions for usage, but that that these are neither necessary not sufficient conditions 
for usage. Strong, Volkoff, Johnson, Pelletier, Tulu, Bar-On Trudel & Garber (2014) 
offer a theory for the actualisation of an affordance, which is conceived as an 
individual journey, with each journey being unique. Individual journeys, which may 
involve learning, overcoming obstacles and misdirections, collectively allow 
organisational objectives to be achieved, thus constituting an organisational journey, 
which can thus involve more than one person.   
 
Directly perceived or interpreted: The notion that an affordance is interpreted is 
counter to Gibson’s notion that objects are directly perceived, though does align with 
Norman’s view of the need for an agent to discover and determine affordances. This 
creates a role for cognition, but cognition, it is claimed, introduces an inaccessible 
‘magical and mysterious’ element into the formulation of an affordance (Bærentsen & 
Trettvik, 2002). The need to perceive or cognise an affordance draws attention to 
Norman’s distinction between perceived and invisible affordances, which need 
signalling (signifers or information), to which Gaver (1991) adds ‘false’ affordances, 
which gives rise to mistaken actions. Thus, an engagement with an object may be 
undermined due to mis-interpretation or lack of information about what it offers. This 
can lead to exploratory activity, the discovery of new information and the detection of 
new affordances, these being ‘sequential affordances’ or ‘nested affordances’ if 
‘grouped in space’ (Gaver, 1991). The example of a door handle reveals this 
progressive mode of discovery: 
For instance, the pivoting door handle… may appear to afford grasping, but 
passive observation will probably not indicate the affordance of turning it or 
using it to open the door. However, once grasped (B), a random or exploratory 
press downwards will convey tactile information revealing the affordance of 
turning the handle. When the handle is fully turned (C), the new configuration 
is one from which pulling is natural. The results of a pull will indicate whether 
the door affords opening or not. (Gaver, 1991: 81) 
The progression from grasping to turning to pulling is sequential, but is nested within 
the affordance of opening the door. This, perhaps, is illustrative of the more general 
notion of how one learns about affordances which Gibson (2000) labels ‘perceptual 
learning’. 
 
A relational or dispositional view of affordance:  Gibson’s (1977) notion of an 
affordance is that it is neither a property of an object nor of a subject or agent, but 
exists with reference to how perceived. This invokes some form of translation 
between property of object and perception by agent, which has been interpreted as 
denoting affordance as being a relational concept (e.g. Hutchby, 2001; Chemero, 
2003; Stoffregen, 2003; Cos-Aguilera et al., 2004; Vyas, Chisalalita & van der Veer, 
2006; Şahin, et al., 2007). For example, Cos-Aguilera et al., (2004) take the view that 
affordances are related to task, environment and agent and, whilst embracing the view 
of affordances as function, also hold the view that affordances are dependent upon the 
agent’s morphology and internal behaviours and goals. The affordances are in the 
relationship.  Likewise, Vyas et al, 2006 view affordances as an ‘interactional’ 
relationship, whereby affordances emerge during the interaction between user and 
environment, with this relationship being interpretative. However, whilst there may be 
general agreement that affordances are relational, there are different explanations of 
how this relationship is brought about.   
 
For example, Stoffregen (2003) argues that the actualisation of an affordance becomes 
an emergent property of the conjoined elements (animal and environment), which 
together offers the affordance: “affordances are properties of the animal–environment 
system, and they exist only at the level of the animal–environment system” 
(Stoffregen, 2003: 124), thus they are emergent properties. This definition emphasises 
that affordances are opportunities irrespective of whether actualised, but that 
actualisation (behaviour) arises when complementary affordances AND intentions are 
conjoined. This allows the availability and persistence of many options in terms of 
affordances and intentions within the animal-environment system, of which only one 
is actualised. 
 
In contrast, Bærentsen & Trettvik (2002) argue that, since affordances have activity as 
their focus, then there is a call for a theory that has activity as the mediating element 
between subject and object. However, they argue that Gibson’s view of activity is 
inadequate as it ignores the development of human activity from a cultural and 
historical perspective (e.g. the division of labour). They draw upon activity theory 
developed by Vygotsky, Leont’ev and others. Activities comprise of motivations, 
goals, which are adapted to the operational conditions. Operations can be viewed at 
both biological (sensory motor systems) and consciousness levels. Gibson’s focus 
upon the behavioural aspect relates to the operational aspect at the biological level. 
 
In contrast, Turvey (1992) argues that possibilities for action are grounded in latent, 
potential or dispositional affordances, which has led to the formulisation of 
affordances as dispositions, where a disposition is a ‘causal propensity’ to realise 
actualisation, this requiring particular conditions, Moreover, all affordances have a 
complement that is an ‘effectivity’, which is “the casual propensity for an animal to 
effect or bring about a particular action… [in other words is] a dispositional property 
of an organism” (Turvey, 1992: 179). Thus, if there is no complement, then there can 
be no dispositional property, which implies that an affordance or effectivity cannot 
exist without the existence of the other. Further, Turvey states “Dispositionals [or 
causal propensities] never fail to be actualized when conjoined with suitable 
circumstances. Disposition and suitable circumstances equals actuality” (Turvey, 
1992: 178). 
 
Turvey’s (1992) dispositional view of affordances which emphasis the object, has 
been developed by Fayard & Weeks (2014), who propose an integrative perspective 
toward affordances, argue that affordances are both relational and dispositional, 
drawing upon Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus to explicate the social 
underpinnings in complementing affordances as a middle-ground theory that can not 
explain the socio-cultural context of this relation. Habitus, defined by Bourdieu (1977: 
214) “as a system of dispositions”, highlights the social nature of personal 
development. Whilst affordances draw focuses attention upon the relationship 
between artefacts and socially embedded individuals, habitus gives account of the 
manner of the social embedding of individuals.  
 
Affordance as representation or as performative: The notion of an affordance as a 
representation is countered by the view that it is performative. Steedman (2002) 
presents a representational model of affordances, relating these to the formation of 
language used in planning purposeful action, this denying Gibson’s notion of direct 
perception. Instead, actions are cognitively represented. Thus, whilst affordances 
relate to properties, they are related through preconditions and consequences: “If the 
precondition is a conditional stimulus such as a light, and the consequence is a 
reward, such as food, while the action concerned is pecking or pressing a bar, then it 
can be considered as a representation of an operant in the cognitive sense…” 
(Steedman, 2002: 733). This formulization relates objects to events in a manner that 
applies to human cognition and/or natural language semantics: the affordance exists as 
a representation. However, Steedman acknowledges that one of the challenges of this 
view is that little is known about the cognition of how objects are conceptualised. 
More recently, Burton-Jones & Grange (2013) drew association between affordances 
and representation theory. The underpinning argument of representation theory is that 
the system represented within an information system is perhaps the only means 
available to observe the represented system (e.g. inventory records to observe 
inventory in a warehouse). Whilst representations assist understanding of situations, 
this is invoked in the cognitive perspective of affordances which requires 
understanding of how to realize the intended outcome.  
 
In contrast, is a view that the affordance manifests through its actualization, that an 
affordance is performative. This was suggested by Eleanor Gibson, whereby, through 
the process of discovering what is being afforded, at the point of its discovery 
becomes performatory (Gibson, 2000). Similarly, Cos-Aguilera et al. (2004) describe 
actions as being performed, with the ‘set of affordances’ being defined by the 
possibility of behaviours being performed. Likewise, Volkoff & Strong (2013) refer to 
the actualisation of an affordance as performed. However, the strongest case for the 
performative nature of affordances is presented by Lindberg & Lyytinen (2013), who 
view affordances as both social constructivist and performative. Whilst any 
understanding of potential use is socially formed, it is in the practical engagement 
when an affordance is performed, that defines the affordance. Lindberg & Lyytinen 
(2013) draw upon Feldman & Pentland (2003) to propose two levels of affordance: 
‘ostensive’ (affordances as abstractions) and ‘performative’ (affordances as 
enactment). Ostensive affordances are instantiated as performative affordances in 
their enactment.  
 
The material dimension: Lindberg & Lyytinen (2013) explain the link between 
affordance and materiality: “an object has materiality because it conveys affordances, 
not because it is solid… [Since] affordances create action possibilities, the object 
impinges on the world, and its implication in activities makes it materiality real, 
whether it is solid or not” (Lindberg & Lyytinen, 2013: 47). This can be interpreted to 
suggest that, irrespective of an object’s physical or digital form, by virtue of its 
presence, it is the materiality of the object that affords possibilities for action.  This is 
illustrated in Treem & Leonardi’s (2012) examination of how organizations use social 
media, which is undertaken using a relational view of affordances.  
 
The social dimension: The notion of affordances has tended to be used in a singular 
sense – the affordances of an object with regard to an agent, e.g. a door handle. 
However, the everyday comprises of many people who selectively engage with many 
objects. Gaver (1996) draws attention to the social implications of affordances that 
they do not exist solely for individual actions but also for social interaction. 
Moreover, that through affordances “social activities are embedded in and shaped by 
the material environment” (Gaver, 1996: 112). Their selection and use is, as proposed 
by Gibson (2000), the outcome of learning to discriminate in this material 
environment, which is, in part, determined by the observer’s “culture, social setting, 
experience and intentions” (Gaver, 1991: 81). Thus, any analysis should establish the 
nature of the complex of factors that shape social interaction (Gaver, 1996). Similarly, 
Vyas et al. (2006) view the interaction between user and technology as socially and 
culturally constructed, which raises awareness of social and cultural contexts. This 
sociocultural domain is also made evident when considering the use of technology as 
practice, the notion of practice invoking social structures and thus social groups. This 
invokes Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of habitus, which Fayard & Weeks (2014) 
introduce to denote the social nature of practice. Thus a more meaningful view of 
affordances is one that can be extended to user groups. This has been explored by 
Leonardi (2013) who proposes the distinction between affordances that are 
idiosyncratically enacted (individualized affordances), those that arise through the 
synchronised activities that use different affordances collectively (collective 
affordances) and those that arise through similar usage (shared affordances).  
 
This draws attention to the social context within which practices manifest and the 
inherent complexity of the interplay between technology and the human agent within 
this social context. Lindberg & Lyytinen (2013) have introduced the concept of 
‘affordance ecologies’, with the ecology metaphor being is used to invoke thinking 
about this complexity and dynamicity, which comprises of three domains: 
infrastructure, organization and practice.  
 
An environmental (spatial) dimension: An alternative view of affordance draws upon 
Gibson’s notion of how an animal interacts with its ‘environment’. This shifts 
attention away from the specifics of the artefact to the arrangement of artefacts within 
a space and how space is designed and used. The affordances offered by space have 
been examined by Maier & Fadel (2003), Maier, Fadel & Battisto (2009) and 
Koutamanis (2005) in the context of architecture, Fayard & Weeks (2005), in the 
context of the office and Atmodiwirjo (2014) in the context of autistic children. The 
organisation of space and artefacts can create an environment that comprises of 
meaningful multiplicities of affordances that support sensory integration and enhance 
experience (Atmodiwirjo; 2014). More specifically, Fayard & Weeks (2005) reveal 
how space can be used to bring people together (i.e. affords proximity), to deny access 
to people (i.e. afford privacy) and to support informal interaction (i.e. affords 
legitimacy). Strong et al. (2014) that a multiplicity or bundle of affordances, which 
may be interrelated, may be actualised at different times drawing attention to a 
temporal dimension.   
 
Do events (a temporal dimension) have affordances? This temporal dimension is 
highlighted in a debate, triggered by Stoffregen (2000), about whether an event has 
affordances. Stoffregen (2000) argues that affordances and events are qualitatively 
different, defining events as static (i.e. stationary) and dynamic (i.e. moving) 
properties of objects and surfaces defined (i.e. measures) independent of the observer” 
(Stoffregen, 2000: 6). Whilst affordances are defined with respect to an animal and 
invoke behaviour, events though being properties, are not defined with respect to an 
animal and do not refer to behaviour. Thus, events cannot be perceived, whereas 
affordances can.  
 
Respondents to this claim included Chemero (2000), Gibson (2000) and Bingham 
(2000). Chemero (2000) questions Stoffregen, particularly his claim that events may 
not be perceived. Events are defined as “changes in the layout of affordances of the 
animal-environment system” (Chemero, 2000: 39). Using the example of an 
experiment involving stepping across a gap between moving platforms (e.g. a boat at 
dock) an event arises when the gap becomes uncrossable (i.e. is action related). 
Gibson (2000a), is more emphatic claiming that “there is no such thing as perceiving 
an affordance without perceiving events” (Gibson, 2000a: 54-55).  The information to 
be found in events about an affordance includes “relevant environment features, the 
activity of the organism, and the consequences that ensue as well as the relations 
among these” (Gibson, 2000a: 54). Bingham (2000) argues that events are perceived 
and offers a critical evaluation of Stoffregen (2000). Bingham counters “events are 
not properties. Events are substantial, spatiotemporal things that can have or exhibit 
properties and that can enter into relations with other properties things, that is, other 
events” (Bingham, 2000: 30). It is argued that, since events can have properties, and 
that properties can support behaviour of a more or less particular form, then events are 
not “intrinsically free of reference to animal behaviour” (Bingham, 2000: 32). 
Moreover, that animals do perceive events. Whilst objects are recognised by their 
form, events are recognised by their spatiotemporal forms, i.e. forms of motion. 
Bingham questions Stoffregen’s interpretation of Gibson’s views about events, 
claiming that Gibson held the view that events are perceived. To reinforce the overall 
argument, attention is drawn to a methodological issue: affordance properties should 
not be perceived without perception of the relevant event, this implying the contextual 
relevance of affordances.  
 
Design of affordance: Norman (1988: 188) argues that a design is likely to have failed 
if it requires instructions; that “it should exploit natural relationships and natural 
constraints”. However Norman (1988, 1999, 2013) acknowledges how concept of 
affordances has been adopted by the design community. One mode of adoption is 
presented by Hartson (2003), who proposes four affordances, each of which are 
selected for how they assist users engage with computers. 
Norman’s perceived affordance becomes cognitive affordance, helping users 
with their cognitive actions. Norman’s real affordance becomes physical 
affordance, helping users with their physical actions. We add a third kind of 
affordance that also plays an important role in interaction design and 
evaluation, sensory affordance, helping users with their sensory actions. A 
fourth kind, functional affordance, ties usage to usefulness (Hartson, 2003: 
316) 
However, Norman (1988, 1999, 2013) conceded that adoption has not necessarily 
been in the manner as intended, in part, arising from misunderstanding about the 
concept. One feature of this misunderstanding is the distinction between an affordance 
and the information to signify an affordance as depicted by Norman (1999, 2013). 
 
This distinction between the design of affordances (utility) and the design of 
information that reveals the affordance (usability) is developed by McGrenere & Ho 
(2000). They discuss the affordances of software in terms of the functions available to 
the user (e.g. text editing, drawing), using the example of a scroll-bar to raise the 
question of whether it is an affordance or information about an affordance, a similar 
argument used by Norman (1999) recording an icon on a screen and whether it is an 
affordance or signifies a affordance. In contrast to Norman, for whom the icon is a 
sign or ‘learned convention’ and thus is not an affordance, McGrenere & Ho (2000) 
argue that the notion of nested affordances explains how the affordance of the 
functionality of software is enabled through the screen’s ‘button’s’ affordance of 
clickability and that the scrollbar (an icon) is an object that affords scrolling. An 
alternative view to the information-affordance debate relates to the distinction 
between action and the control of action, whereby affordances enable action, whilst 




5.0 Discussion – Conclusion 
The preceding evaluation of the concept of affordance draws attention to the problems 
of definition, lack of clarity about how an affordance is enacted as well as the issues 
about whether affordances are perceived or interpreted, are relational or dispositional, 
or are representational or performative. It further reveals that affordances can be 
viewed in terms of material, social, spatial and temporal dimensions. Finally, there are 
debates surrounding the design of affordances. Overall, the single word ‘affordance’ 
is thwarted with multiple interpretations and consequent tensions. However, does it 
matter? 
 
Take the example of a door handle as illustrated in figure 1. How does the concept of 
affordances explain use of this door handle and what can this reveal about different 
interpretations of the concept of affordance?  The two doorknobs, by virtue of their 
shape, can be perceived as the means by which the door could be both opened by 
those authorised and secured. They appear to offer multiple affordances. Whilst the 
upper doorknob may be perceived as offering the most likely means of releasing and 
opening the door, no such mechanism existed, with the signifiers being deceptive and 
the affordance of enabling the door to open being false, it does not exist.  
 
Figure 1. No ordinary door handle. 
 
In the case of the lower doorknob, the affordances offered are not so apparent. To 
open the door, the more astute might interpret the black end section of the knob to 
signify a scanning mechanism that requires something (e.g. a swipe card) to activate 
it, but there is nothing visible to indicate what this might be. The information 
signifying the role of the black end portion requires knowledge as a prerequisite of 
being able to use this lower doorknob and thus actualise its affordance. However, it is 
not apparent that this mechanism that controls the securing of the door, collects data; 
that this door handle is part of an information system that is invisible to the user of the 
door handle. Data is collected about the user entering the room, though not, in this 
case, of leaving the room, with the door handle on the other side of the door being a 
conventional door handle. These affordances are hidden. This distinction between 
visible, invisible and false affordances as well as the role of signifiers supports both 
Norman’s (1988, 2013) and Gaver’s (1991) conceptualisation of affordances.  
 
What differentiates this examination of a door handle from other studies featuring 
door handles (e.g. Norman, 1988; Gaver, 1991; Koutaminis, 2005) is that it reveals 
the affordances offered by a sensor embedded in the handle. These affordances are not 
visible, nor easily discoverable. It requires the person who created and embedded the 
sensor to share knowledge with others, these being those who will collect and use the 
data. That the designer of the door handle has rendered the affordance of collecting 
data invisible, suggests that a, perhaps unconscious, decision has been made about the 
status of the main users of the door handle, the room users. They are to be monitored.  
 
If this one example is extended to the situation where there are many sensors in 
operation, it invites questions about the broader ramifications of sensors distributed 
throughout technologies that become part of the everyday fabric of what are being 
referenced under the terms of ‘smart technologies’, ‘the internet-of-things’ and ‘smart 
cities’. The affordances of smart technologies are not perceptible other than through 
the appearance or form of each artefact. Gibson’s argument that affordances are 
perceptible collapses with the design of ‘smart’ technologies and the invisible 
affordances of data collection, as revealed with the sensor in the door handle. 
Affordances concern what is possible, but digital technologies, particularly those 
involving sensors, do not require perceptual forms to enable them to act. Moreover, 
the affordances of artefacts are enabling other artefacts to act, invisible systems 
comprising of interacting artefacts, serving people in terms of sensing their 
requirements and performing accordingly (e.g. activate lights when a room is being 
entered; remotely report fridge food stock levels).  
 
However, a more sinister aspect is revealed. Few were aware that data about who was 
using the door was being collected. Covert data collection raises the issues of 
transparency, security of data collection, ownership of data collected and the invasion 
of the privacy of those about whom the data relates to, as well as the possibility of 
data exploitation and abuse. This creates an imbalance between those who are 
knowledgeable and have access to these invisible affordances, and those who are 
unaware of them. This invites the anti-social possibilities of monitoring, lurking, 
bullying…  
 
So what does this case reveal? 
 
This case substantiates a number of the dimensions raised previously. The intentional 
nature of behaviour draws attention to the distinction between Gibson’s and Norman’s 
formulisation of affordance. Gibson’s formulization was conducted within the domain 
of the natural world, which did not discriminate between human and animal and 
emphasized the purposive nature of their behavior. Instead, Norman’s formulation 
draws attention to the significance of cognition, interpretation, the purposeful nature 
of human behavior and the designed nature of artifacts.  
 
The case-study presented supports this latter formulization, suggesting that the 
affordance of an artifact is latent (dispositional) until such time that it is discovered 
and actualized by a person using the artifact. Affordances are not properties, but 
properties provide affordances. Affordances do not exist in isolation but as packages 
or ‘affordance configurations’ (Lindberg & Lyytinen, 2013), which can be either 
visible or invisible. This is very evident with information systems and the everyday 
use of these. Users engage through the signage that reveals what possible actions can 
enacted, but this assume knowledge which must be learnt. Thus, an affordance is not a 
representation of possible actions (Steedman, 2002), but is actualized through its 
enactment, actualization arising from perceiving how the artifact can be used. In other 
words, an affordance is performative through its enactment in the sense of Latour 
(1986) and Pickering (1993) as opposed to its other possible meanings (Harwood & 
El-Manstrly, 2012). Its enactment reveals and defines the affordance from the many 
possible affordances an artefact can potentially offer. Unless an affordance is enacted, 
it only exists as a possibility and thus need never be enacted and hence is superfluous.  
 
Whilst Markus & Silver (2008) claim that affordances offer ‘potentially necessary’ 
conditions for usage, but that that these are neither necessary not sufficient conditions 
for usage, it can be argued that affordances are necessary, but not sufficient conditions 
for usage. If there is no affordance, then there cannot be a possibility for action, 
without which there can be no action. For conditions to be sufficient, then this invokes 
a social context and shared knowledge about conventions of behaviour and practice. 
Cars afford the possibility of killing, but there is a convention about cars not being 
used for this activity, irrespective of the knowledge held about how to use a car. It is 
postulated that the situatedness in which an affordance is enacted provides the 
necessary, and sufficient conditions for an affordance to be actualised. This relational 
view of an affordance concurs with Chemero (2003).  
 
As a concept, affordance offers a useful bridging device to explain the interplay 
between the artefact and human user. It draws together a variety of dualities: subject-
object, user-artefact, design-use, perception-intention. These dualities dissolve within 
the concept of an affordance revealing a complex dynamic over space and time within 
the most mundane of enactments. However, if an affordance is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for an enactment, and that the situation within which an 
affordance is latent, provides the necessary and sufficient conditions, then this invites 
questions about what constitutes the situatedness of actualisation. It draws attention to 
the situatedness of practices (Suchman, 1987) and ‘affordance ecologies’ (Lindberg & 
Lyytinen, 2013). More pragmatically, the concept of affordance draws attention to the 
manner in which newer forms of technology (e.g. social media, smart phones) are 
used.     
 
To conclude, the issue is not about the usefulness of the term but about the manner of 
its use. It was claimed in the Introduction that the concept of affordance ‘provides a 
bridge between the social and artefact, offering a concept to explain why a technology 
is taken up’. However, as an explanatory bridging device it loses its power due to the 
multiple ways in which the concept can be constructed. This is problematic in that it 
then becomes difficult to understand in what specific sense an author is using the 
term, if there is any. Indeed, it cannot be assumed that there is a specific construct 
underpinning an author’s use of the term. For example, Lee (2010) argues in his 
critical commentary about IS research, that whilst researchers may espouse a belief in 
‘scientific rigour’, which calls for key terms to be rendered into ‘scientific constructs’, 
in practice, IS researchers can lack rigour in their use of terms, with usage being that 
of the ‘everyday, layperson sense’. Irrespective of whether this is the case, the term of 
affordance is a useful term as it is potentially laden with meaning. However, if this 
meaning is to be usefully conveyed and the concept of affordance is to perform as a 
bridging device, then attention needs to be given to the manner in which the concept 
is constructed in its use and how this is articulated.  
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